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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
)lILTON L. \\rEILEN"'lANN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

(~lUNT

I'

vs.

Case No.

BLACKHURST

\!ORRELL,

1·

12421

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELI:\IINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the court below.
All italics are ours.

STATR~IENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action brought by plaintiff against
rldrnrlant for personal injuries, damage and loss suffered in an intersection accident.
1

40 mph at the point of his last recollection Tl
· le reu,·
warrants no such statement.
··

Defendant was familiar with the intersection, 11
aware of the stop sign and intended to ~top alt .
.
h
I.I
cross-examination, e testified:
·
"Q. You
in that inters""--t,
h reached a point
.
w ere you. came 1~1to contact with a sou'.
bound vehicle havmg the right of wav 1,
proceeded South along "I" Street, did 1.
not?
,
A. That's the evidence. Yes, sir." (R 2041.
Defendant also testified on cross-examination tha+
September, prior to the accident, his head lights f
gone out for some unknown reason, that he had taL
the automobile to a garage, and that the garage n.
been unable to find the cause of the light failure, ,f,
203)

The officer who investigated the accident belie
that the head lights on defendant's automobile 11t:
broken in the collision. (R. 152)

1
•

A home is located near the northwest corner
the intersection some 30 to 40 feet north of the nDr
curb line of 11th A venue and 30 to 40 feet west nf ~
west curb line of "I" Street. (R. 154, 184)
The trial court submitted the case to the jury r·
as to defendant's negligence and proximate cause"
as to plaintiff's contributory negligence and proxun:,
. t · f 'Of of platfi,
cause. The jury returned a ver d ic m a'
.,
and the court rendered judgment on the verdict
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ptJJXT I. THE TRIAL COCRT CORRECTLY
DECIDED THAT THE ISSUES OF \\rHETHEH PLA1XTIFF \VAS GUILTY OF COXTRIBl"l'OHY NEGLIGENCE AND \VHETHER
SlTil NEGLIGENCE, IF ANY, PROXC~ATE
LY Cr\ CSED THE ACCIDENT, \VERE FOR
JU{Y DETERMINATION.
Defendant had the burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause
of the accident. Def en<lant utterly failed in both respects.
The e,·idence showe<l that plaintiff was slowing
from 30 mph at the "slow., sign as he approached the
llllersedion. As he came closer to the intersection, he
lookell to his right an<l viewed the area in the vicinity
uf the stop sign. He then looked to his left and saw no
approaching Yehicles. The steep decline of "I" Street
an<l the dish-out at the I Ith Avenue intersection required
his careful attention. The home located on the north11est c·orner of the intersection limited his Yiew to the
11est. Defendant was traveling 30 mph when he was
:1ppruximately one and a half blocks from the inter1edion. His last recollection was one of intending to
,]ow down and stop at the "I" Street stop sign.

The measurements taken bv the officer show that
plaintiff tra ,·eled through the i.ntersection 33 feet 10
inches to the point of impact, while defendant traveled
i1it0 the intersection 14 feet 6 inches to the point of im-
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pact. Furthermore, defendant had traveled 28 f
eetpa.
.
h
t he stop sign to t e point of impact. Assuming tL ,
,r,
t wo automo bz'l es were traveling at the same rl(Jt
.
IQ/e ,.
s~eed ap~roach~ng and ~ntering the intersection, ~a.·:
tiff wa.s in the intersection 5 feet 10 inches at the f,
defendant was passing the stop sign.
n.
The cases we hereinafter cite make it clear tna
as plaintiff approached the intersection he was entitlt
to expect that he would be accorded the right-of. 11,
until he either saw, or in the exercise of ordinarv car.
should have seen, that the contrary was true. Def;ndau
contends that as a matter of law plaintiff had a duh
to relinquish the intersection to defendant. The burde~
of proof on this issue was clearly on his shoulders. I:
order to sustain this burden it was necessary for at
fendant to prove that he was himself driving in sut'.
an unusual manner that plaintiff, in the exercise,·
ordinary care, had an affirmative duty to take erni1 .
action. Defendant failed to discharge this burden. J
a matter of fact, there was no evidence whatsoevern'
defendant's conduct from a point one and one-b'
blocks away from the intersection down to the W
point of impact.
The leading Utah case on burden of proof as:
contributory negligence in an intersection case is G~'
et al. vs. Blue Cab (1952) 122 U. 312, 249 P.2d :I
In the Gibbs case Justice 'Vade, in a special coJ1('11.
rence, stated: (pp. 321, 322)
"The plaintiffs do not haYe the burden otp:~
ing that decedent was free from neg ge
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11 hich proximately caused the accident or anv
particular fact or set of facts on those issue~,
bt1t defendant is entitled to a directed ,·erdict
on!~· if the evidence is such that the jury would
have to act unreasonably if they were not co11dneed of decedent's fault in ·respect to such
issues. Defendant has the burden of proving
deeedent was guilty of contributory negligence
proximately causing the accident. Also in considering the evidence we should keep in mind
that there is no direct evidence of what decedent
did c~: how he got to the place of the accident,

This Court also recognized in the Gibbs case that contributory negligence and pro,rimate cause are usually
)11n1 questions in intersection ca.yes where Justice Hen:i"'l, in the majority opinion, stated at page 316:
"As in other cases, the reasonable man doctrine,
and the rules pertaining to the function of court
and jury with respect to determination of negligence, contributory negligence or proximate
cause, must be invoked in intersection cases-a
type that creates more difficulty of decision than
most. Difficulty arises in applying the simple,
c.:onstant rules to sh if ting factual scenes."

The case of II ess vs. Robinson, et al. ( 1945) 109
l'. 50, lfi3 P.2d 510, is squarely in point and adverse to
defendant's position. That case involved an intersection
<ll'ci<lent which occurred in Ogden, Utah. Defendant
11
a' proceeding east on 31st Street, ran a stop sign and
collided with plaintiff who was proceeding south on
(;rant rhenue. The trial court held that both defendant
::nd plaintiff were negligent as a matter of law but left
7

G

at a speed of approximately ;jO mph. The contro~,,
circumstances on which the case turned was this Cou;·
opinion that plaintiff, just before entering the i"::
section, would have been justified in considering it 1 ~
to enter because at that point if the truck of defenJ~
was proceeding at a rate of 50 mph and plaintiff 11 ,
proceeding at a rate of 5 to 10 mph (as the eviden
justified) the truck would have been at least 250 (,,
from the intersection. Consequently, plaintiff 11as t:.
titled to have assumed and acted on the assumpti.
that defendant would exercise ordinary care and wow
yield him the right-of-way.
This Court, in ~Morris vs. Christensen (19601 L
U.2d 140, 356 P.2d 34, carries through with then·
tinction so carefully analyzed in the Stevens case"
distinguishes Johnson vs. Syme (1957) 6 l1.2d .JH
313 P.2d 468, the case so heavily relied on by cou~'
for defendant, with the following statement: (p. 142
"The present action does not parallel the ti~
of Johnson vs. Syme upon which defendai
rely. In that case had plaintiff at any tw

observed i!hat which he had a duty to obier;
she would have been able to avoid the col/1w·
Jn the present action the trial court too!•' an W
. and concluded t lwt P[mn
· t'ff
obser:·
site view
1 8 h.
tion would not have forewarned him of 1er
pending hazard."

This Court also stated at page 142:

, . 1eed notn•,,,
"But he who has the rig h t-ot-irny 1
. .
tzcipate
sudden ou tb u1.st s 0 f neqligencc
·.
beo i::.
01
part of another driver. Indeed it m y
1
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that the failure tu observe is neyliyence pro.i:imatel.'} contributing to the harm onl.IJ where b,IJ

0 /;sc1Ti11y

the drfr 1er could have avoided or less-

cr.cd the rcsultinr; harm."

,\nother case holding that a person has no duty
111 dri,·e under the apprehension that another driver
11 ill be guilty of a sudden burst of negligence is the
case of Peterson vs. Xielsen (1959) 9 U.2d 302, 343
P.~d 731.

In conclusion on this point, we believe that the
t;11e gets down to a very few fundamental proposi-

tions .• \s far as defendant's conduct is concerned,
11nl~· two possibilities arc supported by the evidence:
first. that defendant ran the stop sign at a speed
,,f :JU mph or less, or second, that defendant stopped
:it the stop sign and then proceeded into the inter'ediu11 and into collision with plaintiff's automobile.
In either event he was negligent for failure to yield
the right-of-way. As far as plaintiff's conduct is con~erned, he was entitled to proceed into the intersectiiin and to assume non-negligence on the part of defendant until and unless defendant's manner of driving either warned or should have warned him of impend111g danger. On the matter of warning, defendant has
utterly failed to prove that his own manner of driving
11 as of such nature as to warn plaintiff of impending
danger. Yet defendant was faced with the burden of
iir11 1ing that such was the case in order to win this
lawsuit.
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POINT II. INSTRUCTION NO. 16 CORRE:
LY STATES THE LA'VANDIS SUPPORTL
BY THE EVIDENCE.
L
Defendant claims that Instruction No. lti 1,
prejudicially erroneous for the reason that it incorr~
authorized a finding that defendant ran the stop 1;~
\Ve need only point out in this connection that whett:
defendant stopped or didn't stop is immaterial for~
reason that defendant was negligent as a matter
law in either case. He had no legal right to run the'
sign and he had no legal right to burst out from:
stop sign in a sudden act of negligence. Furtherm. r
defendant, having produced no evidence whatsow
as to how the accident happened, leaves plaintiffs Ir
timony completely undisputed. Under plaintiff'sm!
of the accident, defendant simply failed to yield:!
right-of-way and was solely responsible for the acciaf:
We firmly believe that plaintiff was entitled to aholilic.
as a matter of law that defendant was negligent a'.
that his negligence proximately caused the accident
Defendant further complains that the court M
to instruct on the theory that defendant could k
stopped and then had the right-of-way to ~roceed
account of plaintiff not being so close to the mtersect
as to constitute an immediate hazard. The trouble~:
this theorv is that defendant has failed to sustam r
burden of.proof. See Gibbs vs. Blue Cab, supra.
. · portance t
Procedurally, it is of contro11 mg im
"
.
f
. struction n11
defendant made no request or an m
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ihl'on· discussed in the preceding paragraph. ( R. 93llJ!I 1 .The l' tah cases support the proposition that where
it appears that the trial court has failed to instruct on
a 1Iiren point of law, the party adversely affected cannot
,n 1nplain of error on appeal unless the record reveals
that he made a timely request for an instruction on said
point at the trial. See State of Utah, by and through
/t3 lluad Commission vs. George Kendell, (1968) 20
r.~d 35ti, .J.38 P.zd 178, and authorities cited therein.

POIXT Ill. INSTRUCTION NO. 19 CORRECT-

LY STATES THE LA'V AND IS SUPPORTED
BY THE E\'IDENCE. FURTHERMORE, DEFE.\TDANT DID NOT TAKE A PROPER EXCEPT! ON TO SAID INSTRUCTION.
Instrnction No. 19 is a correct instruction under
the authorities cited in Point I which uniformly hold
that a person having the right-of-way at an intersection
ha, the right to assume that other traffic approaching
1aid intersection will yield the right-of-way, unless he
,(e,, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
ieen, something to warn him to the contrary. This rule
is well stated in J.l.F.U. Instruction No. 21.18 and
although said instruction form uses the word "traffic
1
i;nal." the principle is unquestionably the same where
the intersection is controlled by a "stop sign" as in the
1
N· at har . .t\pparently, counsel for defendant is distiirhcd because of the terminology. But only if the
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questioned terminology is such that there is a J'k i·t
•
I e l11r,
that it confused or misled the J· ury would it b t
e ma er
Here, the evidence of the investigating officer and.
other witnesses made it impossible that tl1e J·ur .

have been misled. This is nothing more nor

b

\' till~

thau

effort on the part of counsel to lint-pick his way tu"
undeserved win.
·
Furthermore, counsel is precluded from ques1J1,>
ing Instruction No. 19 on the aforesaid basis bd
failure to take a proper exception, and to thus a.ff1:
the trial court an opportunity to correct what wa,.
most a technical error in terminology. See cow11t1
exception at R. 260, where counsel merely state1 tl
Instruction No. 19 is erroneous for the reason tn,
"plaintiff is not entitled to rely on cross traffic obeyi:.
the traffic sign unless he himself is exercising ordmar
care." At no time did counsel even come close to adri<·.
the trial court of his present contention that the instru ,
tion was wrong because a "signal" is not a "sign."

CONCLUSION
As was pointed out by this Honorable Cilll'.:

Martin vs. Stevens, supra:
"If a driver has to driYe his car under the.
· a~ t t0 be Dt'•
sumption that every one else is
1
gent, the next step would he for hn~ to _c~~~:c:
that he better get off the streets entirel)h ( !rt. l"k 1 t h"t him and abandon t es
one is 1 e Y o 1 • ' ' . .
take ch:1111to those who were 1ust w1llmg to
..:
.
.
h
r1resent ill
If, under circumstances sue as
c
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l'ase. where the plaintiff's right of way is so clear
that uo reasonable person could have any doubt
about it, he could not assume that he would be
afforded his right of way, the only way driYcrs
could ~afely proceed at an intersection would
be to resort to: 'You first, my dear Gaston,no, after you, my clear Alphonse,' procedure or
get out and hold a conference before either could
safely proceed. * * * *
"1 t was the very purpose of avoiding uncertainty
and confusion at intersections, and in order to
make the movement of traffic both practical and
safe, that rules have been established so that
drivers will know which has the right of way."

We submit that in the case at bar plaintiff's rightnf-1rnv was so clear that no reasonable person could
hare any doubt about it. Accordingly, he was entitled
t11 assume that his right-of-way would be honored and
t'' act on that assumption.
We respectfully submit that the judgment in plaintiff"s f arnr should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
\VA YNE L. BLACK and

JOHN L. BLACK of
RA \VLINGS, ROBERTS & BLACK
.530 Judge Building

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY certify that I mailed two copit,
the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prei'
to Raymond M. Berry of "\Vorsley, Snow & Christe1l't
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant, 7th Floor( ,
tinetal Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 8H
on the ____________ day of June, 1971 .
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JOHN L. BLACK
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